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EXTENDING THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF
ACCRETIONS
Mickaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Association
342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961)
Plaintiffs were riparian owners of property fronting on Wild Harbor
in Falmouth, Massachusetts. A sea wall, which had water bracing it at
both high and low tide, protected plaintiff's property. In 1950, the public
works department of Massachusetts authorized the creation of a beach,
abutting the sea wall, by dredging and pumping sand from the floor of the
harbor. Jetties running perpendicular to the shore line into Wild Harbor
were constructed in order to preserve the newly created beach. The plaintiffs
sought to enjoin defendants from using the beach for recreational purposes."
The Superior Court entered a decree dismissing the bill and held that because
the Commonwealth had created the beach, it should be dedicated to the use
of the general public. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed,
holding that there must be a substantial and reasonable connection between
the creation of land and the improvement of navigation before the Common-
wealth can take land in connection with public works projects without
compensating riparian owners. 2
A riparian owner is one who has the right to access and use of the
shore and water adjacent to his property.3 Massachusetts determined in
1907 that private ownership along the tide waters extends to the low-
water mark, not exceeding one hundred rods from the high-water mark,
whether the land was covered with water or not.4 This fee in the land be-
tween the high and low water mark is subject to an easement of the public
for navigation, free fishing and fowling. 5 The term accretion refers to the
situation in which real estate is increased through the gradual deposit of
solid material by water so that dry land is created from land which was
previously submerged.6 The line of ownership of this real estate follows the
changing water line.7 Hence, each riparian owner takes his property with
the knowledge that the boundary may change through accretion or reliction.8
Although reformation of land by accretion is traditionally considered as
1 Defendants were an association of residents of Silver Beach who used the property
in front of plaintiff's land.
2 Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273
(1961).
3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1075 (Cent. ed. 1946); Webster's New International
Dictionary, 1960 (3d ed. 1961).
4 Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907).
n Ibid.
6 Independent Stock Farm v. Stevens, 128 Neb. 619, 259 N.W. 647 (1935);
Baumbart v. McClure, 21 Ohio App. 491, 153 N.E. 211 (1926).
7 Allen v. Wood, 256 Mass. 343, 152 N.E. 617 (1926); East Boston Co. v. Com-
monwealth, 203 Mass. 68, 89 N.E. 236 (1909).
8 Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 4 Am. Dec. 155 (1810).
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a gradual and imperceptible occurrence,9 there are many situations where
artificial operations accelerate the natural processes of accretion and the
additional land is treated as if it were created by natural accretion. 10 For
example, when the government of Oregon extended the banks of the
Willamette River in the interest of commerce without asserting title thereto,
the court ruled that such extensions accrued to the riparian owners."
Similarly, an Alabama Court recognized riparian ownership of accretions
made by the federal government along Mobile Bay.12
In the instant case, however, it was the defendant's contention that
the new land created by the Commonwealth was owned by the Common-
wealth. The authority for this assertion was Home For Aged Women v.
Commonwealth.13 In that case the legislature authorized the erection of
a dam, the building of a lock with a drawbridge, and the filling of a strip
of land outside of the sea wall for a public park as a single project for the
public benefit. The court held that the creation of the park was related
to the improvement of navigation in that it was a natural, if not necessary,
incident of the change in the level of the water. 14
In the principal case the dredging of Wild Harbor was not connected
with the improvement of navigation. The facts indicate that the purpose
of the project was to create a public playground, and only specific powers
to regulate navigatioi and fisheries by the government are expressly recog-
nized as exercisable without compensation to private parties. In order to
qualify under these powers a substantial connection must be shown between
the proposed project and improvement in navigation. 15 For the government
to proceed under the welfare power in building a public beach would require
the exercise of eminent domain.'0
In Ohio the riparian owner is regarded as having a right of access
to navigable water adjacent to his property, 17 and he may build a wharf
9 County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 46, 63 (1874):
The test as to what is gradual and imperceptible in the sense of the rule is,
that though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been
made, he could not perceive it while the process was going on. Whether it is
the effect of natural or artificial causes makes no difference. The result as to
the ownership in either case is the same.
See also State ex rel. Duffy v. Lakefront East Fifty-Fifth Street Corp., 137 Ohio St.
8, 27 N.E.2d 485 (1940).
10 County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, supra note 9; Brundage v. Knox, 279 Ill.
450, 117 N.E. 123 (1917); Burke v. Comm., 283 Mass. 63, 186 N.E. 277 (1933); Adams
v. Frothingam, 3 Mass. 352, 3 Am. Dec. 151 (1807); Lake Front East Fifty-Fifth
Street Corp. v. City of Cleveland, 7 Ohio Supp. 17, 36 N.E.2d 196 (1939); Ohio Rev.
Code § 123.03 (Supp. 1961).
11 Gillihan v. Cieloha, 74 Or. 462, 145 Pac. 1061 (1915).
12 State v. Gill, 259 Ala. 177, 66 So. 2d 141 (1953).
13 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909).
14 Id. at 436, 89 N.E. at 129.
15 Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, supra note 13.
16 Lake Front East Fifty-Fifth Street Corp. v. City of Cleveland, supra note 10.
17 State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 303, 82 N.E.2d 709 (1948).
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out to this water.' 8 This right is subject to control by the federal or state
government in its regulation of navigation, water commerce, and fishery.19
When authorization to build structures which are not in the aid of navigation,
water commerce, or fishery is given by the government and such structures
impair the riparian rights of a proprietor or destroy wharves and structures
built by him in aid of navigation, the riparian owner is entitled to compensa-
tion for his loss and damage.
2 0
Riparian rights are founded on the common law and such rights
constitute a part of the owner's estate in the land. 21 Whether the accretion
is the effect of natural or artificial causes, the riparian right to future
alluvion is a vested right. The title to the increment rests in the law of
nature and is the same right as that of the owner of a tree which later bears
fruit. 22 If the Superior Court's theory in the principal case were followed,
the government could create accretion by dredging along Lake Erie and
claim title to the entire shoreline. Then all riparian owners would be deprived
of access to navigable waters and thereby lose the greatest attraction pos-
sessed by riparian property. The theory of riparian property is to encourage,
not frustrate, the development of private access to the sea. The instant case
adheres to this doctrine and reaches a fair and just result.
1s State v. Cleveland & P.R.R., 94 Ohio St. 61, 113 N.E. 677 (1916).
19 State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, supra note 17; Lake Front East Fifty-Fifth
Street Corp. v. City of Cleveland, supra note 10.
20 State ex rel. Squire v. Cleveland, supra note 17.
21 Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N.E. 86 (1902).
22 Annot., 134 A.L.R. 469 (1941).
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